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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I divide the major late twentieth-century French philosophers 
typically classified as “poststructuralist” – namely Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, and Michel 
Foucault – into two camps, based on what I diagnose as their fundamentally divergent 
epistemological attitudes. The immediate point of drawing this division is to break up the 
apparent unity of “poststructuralism,” though it also serves to introduce an epistemological 
thesis with a wider potential applicability. I suggest that Deleuze and Derrida, despite 
differences that in some ways amount to a diametrical opposition, are united by an assumption 
that it is possible – at least in principle – to reconcile language with reality. On the other hand, 
I claim that Foucault thinks the relationship of language and reality in terms of fundamental 
and irreparable discontinuity, in this respect having more in common with Jacques Lacan than 
the contemporary compatriots with whom Foucault is more often associated. 
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In this paper, I divide the major late twentieth-century French philosophers 
typically classified as “poststructuralist” – namely Gilles Deleuze, Jacques 
Derrida, and Michel Foucault – based on what I diagnose as their 
fundamentally divergent epistemological attitudes. I suggest that Deleuze and 
Derrida, despite differences that in some ways amount to a diametrical 
opposition, are united by an assumption that it is possible – at least in principle 
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– to produce a discourse that is in some sense continuous with reality. While 
both pointedly reject what they see as naïve correspondence accounts of 
knowledge, they nevertheless hope to reconcile language and reality in various 
ways. On the other hand, I claim Foucault thinks the relationship of language 
and reality in terms of fundamental and irreparable discontinuity, in this 
respect having more in common with Jacques Lacan than the contemporary 
compatriots of his with whom he is more often associated. 
This epistemological opposition could be read back across a wider swathe of 
the history of philosophy, but in this present article I will limit my inquiry to 
this highly specific geographical and historical locus. I would provisionally 
assert however that the significance of the division I am naming here is less 
parochial than this discussion might be taken to imply.  
PRECURSORS 
Inspiration for the distinction I draw comes from Foucault’s (1978) influential 
depiction – in his introduction to the English translation of Georges 
Canguilhem’s Normal and the Pathological – of twentieth century French 
philosophy as made up of two strands, distinct but not entirely separate. 
Foucault (x) does not give these two tendencies definite names, describing them 
rather in multiple ways as, on the one hand, “a philosophy of experience, of 
sense, and of subject” and on the other “a philosophy of knowledge, of 
rationality and of concept”.  
As Giuseppe Bianco (2011) has pointed out, Foucault’s contribution here is 
not in itself particularly original, following rather in the footsteps of more senior 
members of the rational-conceptual camp – including Canguilhem, Claude 
Lévi-Strauss, and Louis Althusser – in dividing things this way. Bianco shows 
how the marking of this historic division has its roots in the pointed drawing of 
battle lines between phenomenology and structuralism in the 1960s. Bianco 
also notes that this drawing of battle lines in French philosophy did not stop 
with Foucault, but has been continued in similar vein by Alain Badiou. I might 
humbly situate my own contribution here in this same partisan tendency, as a 
further extension of or redrawing of these lines in a continuing conflict. 
Foucault in making his distinction divides up the generation of philosophers 
that came before him, putting Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty on 
the side of subjectivity, and Jean Cavaillès, Bachelard and Canguilhem on the 
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side of the concept. It is unclear whether his categorization is meant to be 
exhaustive in relation to French philosophy, but there are certainly some 
relatively major figures he does not name. Some French Hegelians are missing, 
in particular Foucault’s sometime teacher Jean Hyppolite – though one such 
Hegelians, Alexandre Koyré, is included by Foucault in the conceptual faction, 
due presumably to his work in the history of science. Nietzschean literary 
figures such as Georges Bataille and Pierre Klossowski are also absent, which I 
think may be accounted for by the fact they can be considered writers rather 
than philosophers per se. 
Foucault mentions multiple divisions prominent in French thought in the 
period under discussion in addition to the one he proposes: those between 
‘Marxists and non-Marxists, Freudians and non-Freudians, specialists in a 
single discipline and philosophers, academics and non-academics, theorists and 
politicians’. He proposes to posit a further bifurcation to be added to these, in 
no way denying their importance. It is in the same spirit that I now propose my 
own division. That said, the division I am proposing is posited primarily in 
relation to a slightly more recent period than Foucault’s. 
It is not immediately clear how the main division that Foucault proposes – 
or indeed any of the others he mentions – might be said to play out in his own 
generation. There is no question that he situates himself in the tradition of 
Canguilhem, but he does have influences from both sides and in his generation 
there was more of a mixture of influences than in the previous one, whereas at 
least the canonical older figures he names belonged to one side of the other 
with relatively little admixture. Among Foucault’s peers in the 1960s, there was 
a general inclination towards the philosophy of the concept in reaction to the 
reigning dominance of the philosophy of the subject, with Sartre at its head. 
This reaction encompassed not only Foucault but also the younger post-
Althusserian philosophers who are still with us, as well as older French 
“structuralists,” such as Althusser and Lacan.  
However, Foucault’s most prominent “poststructuralist” contemporaries, 
Derrida and Deleuze – two philosophers who like Foucault came to 
prominence during the 1960s (although slightly after him) and constituted the 
dominant position in French philosophy by the 1980s in particular – stand in 
profoundly ambiguous relations to his division. Deleuze’s thought is certainly 
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readily describable as a “philosophy of the concept,” given his identification of 
philosophy with conceptual innovation (Deleuze 1994). However, he does not 
stand as closely in the lineage of either “structuralism” or French philosophy of 
science – unlike Foucault or the other figures Foucault names on the 
conceptual side – and Deleuze’s emphasis on experience and “affect” is at least 
suggestive of a philosophy of the subject, indicating a certain debt to 
phenomenology, in particular via Merleau-Ponty.1 Derrida is still closer to the 
side of the subject: though he was influenced very explicitly by structuralism, it 
is equally clear that he situates himself primarily in the broad (post-
)phenomenological tradition that was the major affiliation of those Foucault 
deems philosophers of the subject in the preceding generation. Notwithstanding 
Foucault’s (1978, x) suggestion – following Cavaillès (1970) – that both the 
strands he identifies take up the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl when it 
reaches France in the 1930s, reading it in different directions, phenomenology 
as such lends itself much more to a philosophy of the subject, and certainly the 
figures Foucault names as part of this tendency are the most aligned with 
phenomenology. That said, Derrida radically distances himself from all 
previously existing philosophy, much as Deleuze strikes a path that is highly 
idiosyncratic relative to any of his contemporaries, hence these various 
connections and affiliations are not immediately decisive. 
It is precisely in light of this difficulty in tracing the continuation of the two 
tendencies Foucault had diagnosed in earlier French twentieth century 
philosophy in his own generation that I will suggest a novel one to divide it. 
While I speak of a ‘generation’ here, I will in fact focus on only three thinkers, 
Deleuze, Foucault, and Derrida, a sub-generation of major French 
philosophers born between 1925 and 1930. One could extend this range slightly 
to include other thinkers, such as Jean-François Lyotard, born a year before 
Deleuze, or Jean Baudrillard, born a year before Derrida, but those thinkers 
attained somewhat less prominence than the big three, slightly later – and in 
 
1 One might defer here to Badiou’s (2012) rediscription of the history of French philosophy as a division 
between a philosophy of the concept and a “philosophy of life,” since this places Bergson as the origin of 
the latter camp and hence allows us to place Deleuze there more decisively due to the influence Bergson 
had on him. The most obvious problem with such a division, however, is that it ends up seeing Georges 
Canguilhem, whose thought is effectively the lynchpin of the philosophy of the concept for Foucault, 
being placed now in the other camp, because of his vitalism. 
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any case tackling the three figures I have chosen is more than enough to 
occupy this article. Moreover, it is these three above all that are commonly 
thought of together, typically under the umbrella term of ‘poststructuralism’. 
This term of course itself does indicate a certain lack of theoretical unity in this 
generation, indeed that it is united only by coming after ‘structuralism’. Still, I 
think it is imagined commonly enough that Derrida, Deleuze, and Foucault 
can be treated as if they are of the same ilk that the corrective I am offering 
here might be useful. Moreover, when they are divided up, it is typically by 
placing Foucault and Deleuze together as differing from Derrida (e.g. Agamben 
1999). 
DISCONTINUISM 
The principle of the division I will posit here is derived from Foucault’s 
Introduction, albeit obliquely. My division bears some relation to Foucault’s, 
but is not meant as a redefinition it; it is rather meant as distinct in its own 
right.  
Foucault begins his introduction to The Normal and the Pathological by 
describing the cleavage in twentieth century French philosophy, but moves on 
to describe Canguilhem’s thought in some detail. It is the point on which 
Foucault ends that particularly interests me. He suggests there that for 
Canguilhem, at base, the human is 
a living being who is never completely at home, a living being dedicated to 
"error" and destined, in the end, to "error". . . . Error is at the root of what makes 
human thought and its history. The opposition of true and false, the values we 
attribute to both, the effects of power that different societies and different 
institutions link to this division – even all this is perhaps only the latest response 
to this possibility of error, which is intrinsic to life. If the history of science is 
discontinuous, that is, if it can be analysed only as a series of "corrections," as a 
new distribution of true and false which never finally, once and for all, liberates 
the truth, it is because there, too, "error" constitutes not overlooking or delaying 
a truth but the dimension proper to the life of men and to the time of the species. 
(xix) 
I am not concerned for the moment with the extent to which this is an 
accurate exegesis of Canguilhem and to what extent this is Foucault’s own 
position, though I would argue that Canguilhem’s vitalism points in a less 
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relativist (and more progressivist) direction than Foucault’s reading, and even 
on this reading Canguilhem remains more vitalist and anthropological than 
Foucault himself is. What interests me is the general epistemological 
perspective that Foucault lays out here that error is the basis of knowledge. It is 
on this radical note that Foucault (xx) ends his Introduction.  
This position is not synonymous with the “philosophy of the concept,” 
though it is aligned with it in Foucault and Canguilhem’s cases. It is rather – 
whatever else it may be allied to or alloyed with – indicative of a distinctive 
epistemological orientation, which I will call discontinuism, the view that 
knowledge is fundamentally discontinuous with extra-discursive reality, and 
that all human life bears witness to the effects of this mismatch and the 
generation of error that goes along with any attempt at speaking the truth. It is 
this orientation that I want to posit as constituting a distinct and fundamental 
point of divergence between Foucault and his most prominent poststructuralist 
peers, whom I will by contrast characterise as continuist. 
If human knowledge is always error then there is no entirely correct 
knowledge. Now, this premise might make discontinuism seem simply to be 
another word for fallibilism. There are any number of differences between 
these positions, however, coming as they do from quite different philosophical 
loci and traditions. At heart, though, I take it the difference is that while 
discontinuism claims that all knowledge actually is erroneous, fallibilism 
consists in the belief that any and all knowledge might be erroneous and is hence 
always defeasible. That is to say that discontinuists claim that all our beliefs 
actually are to some extent false, whereas fallibilism merely allows the universal 
possibility of error. Fallibilism and discontinuism are similar in that neither 
necessarily undermines scientific truth-claims, but rather instead both tend to 
support making such claims on the basis that they are not final statements of 
fact, but provisional and defeasible findings. The difference here is that while 
fallibilism allows a continual scientific progress through the improvement of 
findings, discontinuism tends to the more relativist conclusion that there is no 
clear arbiter of correctness and that since all positions are essentially erroneous, 
there is no superior position that can be moved to through falsification. 
Discontinuism holds that knowledge will always be erroneous because there 
is an ineluctable scission between thought and its object. Though Foucault 
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thematises the concept of “error” only here, in relation to Canguilhem, he 
reiterates this basic epistemological insight multiple times in the course of his 
career in other terms. As Foucault (1994b, 552) puts it in an earlier text, ‘Truth 
and Juridical Forms’, ‘la connaissance est toujours une méconnaissance’. This 
French epigram is ultimately untranslatable, since there is no English term 
equivalent to méconnaissance, literally “misknowledge,” but we may capture the 
point by saying that all knowing is a form of misknowing, or perhaps less 
outlandishly, though more liberally, that all understanding is a form of 
misunderstanding. One may refer also to his remark in his essay on Nietzsche 
and genealogy that “Knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for 
cutting” (Foucault 1998, 380). It should be noted that both this line and his line 
from ‘Truth and Juridical Forms’ are exegeses of Nietzsche, and that 
Nietzsche’s position is seminal to Foucault’s here, though also that his exegeses 
of Nietzsche are tendentious and may to a large extent be taken as a 
ventriloquism of Foucault’s own position. One can refer here also to a yet 
earlier injunction of Foucault’s, not indexed to Nietzsche, from his 1970 
inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, L’ordre du discours (which has 
appeared in English under multiple different titles, although never, as it did in 
French, as a book), that ‘We must conceive discourse as a violence that we do 
to things’.2 Foucault’s infatuation with the metaphor of violence was of 
relatively brief duration, but the theme of a fundamental mismatch between 
words and things is consistent across his career, if instantiated during the late 
1960s primarily by refusing to pay much attention to the latter. Nevertheless, 
this problematic is identified in the title of his Les mots et les choses (“Words and 
Things,” published in English as The Order of  Things), even though the book 
almost exclusively concerns itself with discourse.  In the preface to this book, 
Foucault (2002, xxii) inveighs that ‘there exists, below the level of [a culture’s] 
spontaneous orders, things that are in themselves capable of being ordered’, 
However, the discontinuist orientation is I think encapsulated most clearly 
not in Foucault’s work, or in Canguilhem’s, but in that of a contemporary who 
also may be said to belong to the conceptual camp in twentieth century French 
thought, but who does not figure in Foucault’s counting of its members, and 
 
2 Foucault 1971, 22. 
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indeed who is not typically counted as a philosopher at all, and certainly 
doesn’t consider himself one: Jacques Lacan. Lacan is also sometimes counted 
as a ‘poststructuralist’, though is clearly of an older generation than the figures 
I am treating under that label and is more commonly called a ‘structuralist’ (it 
is perhaps no coincidence that Foucault was himself the youngest French 
intellectual to find himself regularly called ‘structuralist’ during the 1960s).3 
Lacan conceptualises the scission between knowledge and its object 
schematically as the disjuncture between knowledge and truth – the former 
being symbolic, the latter real (Lacan 2006, 798). This conceptual division is 
quite foreign to Foucault, who uses the word ‘truth’ like ‘knowledge’ to refer to 
contingent ways of ordering statements. Still, as Amy Allen (2018, 179) notes, 
Foucault’s Blanchotian notion of an ‘outside’ of discourse is closely equivalent 
to Lacan’s concept of an extra-symbolic ‘real’. Lacan is not alone in defining 
‘truth’ as extra-discursive, however – Sartre (1992, 3) does the same thing, albeit 
without suggesting that the cleavage between truth and language is as basic or 
irreparable. The difference between Foucault and Lacan here is merely a 
semantic one, but it is apt to confuse, as is Lacan’s conceptual division between 
reality (which for him is an imaginary image) and the real (which is what lies 
outside symbolisation). Indeed, as I argue elsewhere (in currently unpublished 
work), such terminological differences lead Foucault himself to fail to 
understand how close his position is to Lacan’s. I prefer to conceptualize the 
key distinction as the difference between knowledge on the one hand and the 
reality that knowledge tries but fails to describe on the other,4 and to 
conceptualize the relation between the two things as always already riven. I 
would argue, after Foucault and Lacan, that there is not merely a gap here, but 
a tear, because this discontinuity appears for an animal which previously had 
not, as an infant, experienced it, and because language is an irruption into a 
reality that it does not leave undamaged. I regard this discontinuity between 
language and reality as necessary because of a complexity problem: reality is 
 
3 Lacan was fully 29 years older than Derrida – but due to the fact Lacan was a practising psychiatrist 
rather than an academic, his entry into theory didn’t begin till he was in his 30s, and he published very 
little, with his first book (the anthology Écrits) appearing only in 1966, contemporaneously with Derrida’s 
earliest work. 
4 Lacan does not like to use the word ‘reality’ in this way, because for him this word refers to our 
imaginary fantasy of what the world is like. 
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vastly more complex than language, hence the former cannot be adequately 
represented in the latter. This is true not only of the totality of the universe, but 
even of small pieces of it: even momentary human experiences contain a 
richness of elements that we cannot hope to be fully describe with language. 
There is in addition something akin to the qualia problem here: even if an 
experience and a language were of equal complexity, putting something in 
language would never fully convey what it is to have the experience. 
One might argue that this implies only that we simply partially understand 
rather than always misunderstand a world that we will never understand 
entirely.5 The problem is that partial understanding does always imply 
misunderstanding, because facts are contextual. If I understand some fact 
about a thing, but miss others, I do not understand the thing, and therefore do 
not understand the fact. Indeed, this way of speaking is flawed in itself: there 
are no ‘facts’ which exist as discrete bits of information that we can correctly 
understand without understanding others, but rather we understand things 
according to an imperfect total picture that is ultimately always erroneous both 
in its details and as a whole. 
I must distinguish what I am calling “discontinuism” from a pre-existing use 
of the discontinuisme in French, which indeed is invoked by Foucault (1978 xv) 
adjectivally in scare quotes in his Introduction to Canguilhem. While the word 
can refer to any form of emphasis on discontinuity, it primarily – as it does in 
Foucault’s usage here – refers to the emphasis on discontinuity in the history of 
knowledge. This form of discontinuism, which I will qualify after Foucault (xvi) 
as “historico-epistemological,” is also one to which his thought clearly cleaves, 
following Canguilhem, and – though Foucault does not mention him here – 
Gaston Bachelard, whose concept of rupture Foucault (2002) adopts elsewhere. 
The “discontinuity” Foucault invokes here is in what is considered true 
between different scientific theories or time periods. Positing such discontinuity 
implies a form of relativism about scientific truth for Foucault (1978 xv), but 
discontinism is not merely historical relativism: it implies that historical periods 
are divided by discrete breaks that do not (and cannot) involve a total lack of 
 
5 I am grateful to Alexei Procyshyn for this objection. Procyshyn suggested that this is Deleuze and 
Guattari’s position, one shared by Walter Benjamin. 
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continuity, but nonetheless constitute discontinuities in the history of 
knowledge; this could be compatible with a certain historico-epistemological 
progressivism, though it is not in Foucault’s case. 
The epistemological orientation I am calling discontinuism is only 
contingently related to historico-epistemological discontinuism: it is possible to 
be discontinuist in this sense while being historico-epistemologically continuist 
or vice versa, since the variation of knowledge throughout history does not 
logically require an explanation in terms of a scission between thought and 
reality, and the scission between thought and reality does not logically require 
periodical revolutionary changes in knowledge. That said, there is a tendency 
for both forms of discontinuism to correlate to one another, and this is not 
accidental, inasmuch as a basic mismatch between knowledge and reality 
would tend to imply that knowledge will tend to lack any secure basis that 
prevents it changing, that it will never reach a final equilibrium at which it 
stops changing, and that since it has to find its principle of stability in itself 
rather than in reality that it will lurch from self-sustaining formation to self-
sustaining formation rather than changing continuously. These historico-
epistemological shifts also imply importantly though I think that knowledge is 
nonetheless trying to grasp reality, and it is in this attempt that it is made to 
continuously change, in part in response to changes in the real itself, in part 
simply by the weight of its inevitable errors. 
 
One might also confuse the position I am calling discontinuism with 
Quentin Meillassoux’s (2008) critique of “correlationism.” What I call 
“continuism” is not the same thing that Meillassoux, and after him the other 
“speculative realists,” call “correlationism.” For Meillassoux (5), 
“correlationism” refers to “the idea according to which we only ever have 
access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term 
considered apart from the other.” For Meillassoux, all late modern philosophy 
is correlationist, including all the thinkers considered here. From my 
perspective, Meillassoux’s position is itself continuist: he attacks those who 
assume a correlation of thinking and being (which is certainly one form of 
continuism), but does so not in the name of an ultimate impossibility of 
describing reality (which is what the perspective I call discontinuism implies by 
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my lights), but rather in favour of arguing for a positive ontology of what is 
outside thinking (itself a continuist aim, insofar as it aims to reconcile thought 
to being at a meta level). 
This discontinuist perspective can be counterposed most obviously to a 
progressive vision of scientific knowledge allied to a correspondence theory of 
truth, according to which the history of science can be characterised as a 
gradual progress towards a perfectly apt description of reality. This view can be 
characterized as continuist in its view both of history and of knowledge. I want 
to suggest that such bald continuism is rare, however; few if any thinkers would 
explicitly take up such a naïve position, particularly in twentieth century 
French philosophy. Yet, epistemological continuism nonetheless infects it 
widely, even where there is historical-epistemological dicontinuism. Assertions 
of discontinuities in the history of knowledge can be reconciled with a 
continuist epistemology via a broadly Hegelian solution, a dream that 
ultimately this discontinuity will end and things will coincide once again. 
Now, I should perhaps clarify the implication of my invocations 
“continuity” and “discontinuity”. Discontinuists, in either sense, do not believe 
in an absolute discontinuity – they are not substance dualists with an 
interaction problem – any more than continuists believe that there is literally 
no difference at all between words and things, or that nothing ever changes. 
Foucault (1989) considers concepts to be part of reality, to be material, but 
nevertheless as a different type of thing to concrete objects (Kelly 2009 – Tom 
Eyers [2011] has similarly claimed Lacan’s position regarding language is 
materialist). They however oppose a conception of the interaction between 
historical periods, or between words and things, which has them fitting together 
easily, harmoniously, and without remainder. Indeed, discontinuism should be 
understood as having the recursive implication that knowledge, being material, 
is also discontinuous with itself, in the sense that we not only have an erroneous 
conception of our reality, we also have an erroneous conception of our own 
knowledge (a problem then that would necessarily affect all of my attempts to 
understand the thoughts of the thinkers under discussion in this paper). 
Epistemological discontinuity is not so much a hard break between knowledge 
and reality, as one that infects knowledge itself as such. We may indeed suspect 
that discontinuity infects reality as such – and clearly does insofar as knowledge 
 MARK G. E. KELLY 335 
itself is real and exhibits this discontinuity. Continuism differs in thinking that 
words and things, or even words and other words, are ultimately reconcilable. 
Foucault (2006, 105) says that ‘continuity is actually a phenomenon of 
discontinuity’. He glosses this by saying that even things that apparently stay 
the same are changed by the changing context. Continuists by contrast can be 
characterised as holding that discontinuity is actually a phenomenon of 
continuity, that beneath and across all the changes something remains the 
same, even – I will claim – if it is difference itself as such. 
DELEUZE, DERRIDA, FOUCAULT 
If Foucault and Lacan are exemplary discontinuists, I will argue that Derrida 
and Deleuze are united in epistemological continuism, albeit of an obscure kind 
in each case. Given the enormous difference between these two philosophers’ 
thoughts, their continuism manifests itself in quite different ways, although not 
without some similarities.  
There is much that can be said about the triangular relations between 
Derrida, Deleuze, and Foucault (bracketing Lacan, who was not of their 
generation and had complicated relationships with each of those three). Their 
personal relations varied: Foucault taught Derrida but they spent most of their 
intellectual career at daggers drawn with little contact; Foucault and Deleuze 
were close personal friends for some years before they fell out; Deleuze and 
Derrida knew each other only relatively slightly, but according to Derrida 
(2001) were always on friendly terms. However, I’m interested here solely in the 
relation between their ideas. While the occasional sniping and general coolness 
between Foucault and Derrida does reflect the divergence of their positions, it 
doesn’t really quite represent its depth. Conversely, I think that the personal 
closeness of Deleuze and Foucault did much to conceal – even from the men 
themselves – a trench between their positions.  
Philosophically, there are some noteworthy commonalities between all 
these three poststructuralists. The decisive influence of Nietzsche is one, though 
they each took different things from him. They also share a certain 
ambivalence towards Freudian psychoanalysis, at once influenced profoundly 
by it but keen to challenge it (although Derrida less than the other two). Beyond 
that, we find differences: Deleuze considers himself a metaphysician, Derrida 
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rails against metaphysics, whereas Foucault eschews discussing it; Deleuze 
considers himself a Marxist, while Derrida and Foucault each distance 
themselves from Marxism (while remaining also quite explicitly influenced by 
it); perhaps most decisively for our purposes, Derrida and Deleuze both make 
much of the notion of ‘difference’, where Foucault does not. Lastly, we should 
mention the relation to structuralism: Foucault was considered a structuralist in 
the 1960s, and, while he did not accept the label, he nonetheless closely 
identified his project with others who were also considered part of this 
movement, most explicitly Lévi-Strauss (Foucault 2002, 413), and also 
sometimes Lacan and Althusser (Foucault 1994a, 653). Derrida (1997), engaged 
in an explicit reaction against Saussure’s structuralism, turning it against itself, 
while pillorying Lévi-Strauss, using the Saussure’s model of language against its 
inventor by making the relation between words a model for the relation 
between words and things. Deleuze, for his part, had less overt relation to 
structuralism than the other two. 
DERRIDA 
Derrida, it seems to me, inherits continuism from phenomenology, despite his 
significant divergence from its classical mode. Husserl’s war cry, hin zu den 
Sachen, explicitly expresses a desire to base knowledge directly on things, in the 
sense of phenomena, to deal with the failure of the conventional sciences. 
French phenomenology in its first generation, in the principal shapes of 
Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, is resolutely continuist. While ontologically there is 
a serious divergence between Merleau-Ponty’s (1968) conceptualisation of 
subjectivity as a fold in being – clearly indicating a deep continuity between 
material reality and consciousness – and Sartre’s theory of subjectivity as 
negativity, and while the latter would seem to amount to a form of ontological 
discontinuity, it is not at all clear that this is carried over by Sartre into a 
discontinuist epistemology; rather, he continues to hope for redemption 
through authenticity and historical progress. Even the late Heidegger’s 
ruminations on language and thinking, which are so influential on Derrida, 
don’t entirely break with the idea that language and reality can and must be 
brought together.  
Still, the general tendency of (post-)phenomenology after Husserl’s initial 
formulation of the project is to depart from mere correspondence in a direction 
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of a problematisation of the relationship between language and reality. 
Philosophers in this tradition tend to think that language has done violence, but 
unlike discontinuists to believe that this problem is fixable. Many figures in this 
tradition are concerned to criticise ‘dichotomous’ thinking, particularly the 
positing of splits between subject and object, and hoping to heal these rifts by 
conceptualising things differently. Hence Emmanuel Levinas for example 
wants to oppose the dichotomy between self and other. A typical move – again 
not made by all thinkers of this tradition, but made by Heidegger as an 
essential part of his philosophical perspective, and then taken up by several 
thinkers influenced by him – is to posit an historical orthodoxy (which may be 
called ‘Cartesianism’ or ‘metaphysics’) that propagates dichotomies, from 
which we now need to rescue ourselves. It takes dichotomies that are 
traditionally regarded as ontologically basic and instead understands them as a 
matter of an historically contingent ontological view.  
This is not to suggest that discontinuists accept these traditional 
dichotomies. Rather, for them the language–reality dichotomy displaces older 
ones. While it might appear to replicate them, in particular the Kantian break 
between the subject and the object, discontinuism differs for one thing in 
implying discontinuity within the subject itself, insofar as ‘subject’ is a concept 
imposed on and deeply altering the non-linguistic reality of subjective 
experience. Indeed, we can go further and note that words cannot even 
adequately describe their own meaning exhaustively: language itself is a reality 
that language cannot accurately describe, that the word ‘language’ is 
inadequate to conceptualise. This might seem to suggest that Derrida is right, 
and that a hard distinction between language and reality is untenable, but I am 
suggesting that on the contrary it merely indicates how ubiquitous and far-
reaching this divide is. 
Derrida’s project, following Heidegger, is a critique of metaphysics, 
understood as requiring a wholesale revision of language that will reconfigure 
what I am calling the reality-language relation. Indeed, I take it that this is the 
principal target of Derrida’s early critique of structuralism. Derrida’s (1997) 
critique of “logocentrism” is explicitly primarily a critique of correspondence 
theories of truth, of the idea that words are supposed to operate via a one-to-
one correlation to things. He takes up Ferdinand de Saussure’s insight that 
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words derive their meaning through the interplay of differences from other 
words within language, and contends against Saussure that this interplay is also 
how words refer to non-linguistic things, through a play of differences that 
encompasses both all words and all things. This argument is based in the 
Heideggerian insight that for humans all objects are ‘sign-like’. For Derrida, 
language and reality are both ultimately a matter of the same thing, what 
Derrida calls ‘writing’. Foucault, by contrast, while allowing certainly that 
words are something that exist in the same world as things and which therefore 
can affect them, and to that extent that language is part of reality, wants 
nonetheless to insist that there is an extent to which language will never be like 
non-linguistic reality. 
From a Foucauldian perspective, Derrida’s position is a case of what 
Foucault (1971b, 21) calls “logophobia,” either the mistrust of language as such 
because of its difficulties in dealing with reality, or the mistrust of the specific 
language we currently speak. Derrida clearly exhibits the latter tendency, and 
evinces utterly explicit logophobia, inasmuch as he takes as a chief critical 
target the logos itself, qua model of the operation of language. 
Derrida’s elision of the distinction between words and things is 
epistemological continuism par excellence. Derrida dreams of the emergence of a 
language which is not logocentric, which does not think of the word as referring 
the things in a linear way, distinct from other words, but which rather 
acknowledges the endless play of difference that is found in reality, both 
linguistic and concrete. He proposes in the interim using old metaphysical 
concepts ‘under erasure’, but hopes to get beyond this (Derrida 1997, 61). 
Rather than hope for correspondence, Derrida hopes that by giving up the 
hope of referentiality, we can allow words and things to coexist, through an 
awareness of the ineluctably poetic relations between them.  
Heideggerian emphasis on epochal shifts is historico-epistemologically 
discontinuist, and indeed was influential on both Foucault and Lacan. The 
difference with this acknowledgement of historical discontinuity by Heidegger 
and Derrida is that they invoke it as a way of explaining the existence of 
discontinuity between language and experience, rather than as its result, seeing 
this as a kind of regrettable perversion of the proper relationship. 
Heideggerians seek, unlike Foucault (or Lacan), to set things aright (again).  
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Now, Derrida does diverge from Heidegger by taking up the latter’s most 
radical insights. Derrida (1982, 17) thus attempts to overcome any binary 
between continuity and discontinuity: for him, the terms of every binary 
opposition are united in the sameness of their difference. And indeed, it is true 
that there can be no continuity without discontinuity or vice versa. In a broad 
sense, then, for Derrida, discontinuity is just as ubiquitous as continuity. 
However, the radical form of discontinuity as irreparable cleavage between 
language and reality is not possible for Derrida, precisely because it means 
privileging discontinuity above continuity. Even if he can allow that there is a 
generic difference between words and things, deconstruction can at most 
acknowledge the general difference here as an aporia that cannot be resolved. 
From a discontinuist position, however, mere acknowledgment of difference 
is insufficient to capture the radicality of the phenomenon of discontinuity, on 
those exceptional occasions when it does occur radically. As Badiou (2001, 26) 
so incisively instructs us, since everything is different from everything else, 
difference is so ubiquitous it tells us approximately nothing. To say, as Derrida 
effectively does, that everything is different from everything else, ends up 
having more or less the same implication as the arch continuist claim that 
everything is the same. His valorisation of difference ends up reducing any 
special difference to banality. Thus, the division between language and reality 
is elided and made simply another instance of difference.  
What can the discontinuist critique of such a position be? Not, surely, that it 
is erroneous, because just as Derrida’s position renders difference banal, 
discontinuism renders error omnipresent. However, from a discontinuist 
position it is imperative to acknowledge the existence and importance of error 
as such, just as it is for Derrida to acknowledge the importance of difference. 
From Derrida’s point of view this specialness of error disappears, since error is 
reduced to difference.6 Indeed, error might be said to figure in Derrida’s 
worldview not as ubiquitous to human knowledge, but as what happens when 
the ubiquity of difference is not acknowledged as such, even if this is not how 
 
6 My reading of Derrida here is offered pace that of Christopher Norris (2014) in particular, who reads 
Derrida as an epistemological realist with a relatively conventional conception of truth, but I take it that 
this is an extreme outlier in terms of readings of Derrida on this question, and indeed is a reading that 
lacks any real support to be found in Derrida’s explicit claims (see Shain 2018). 
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Derrida conceptualises things.  
Discontinuism does not however commit the converse error to Derrida’s 
reduction of error to difference, does not reduce difference to error. Rather, 
error is peculiar kind of difference specific to human knowledge. This is not to 
say that discontinuism asserts anthropocentrically that error is a form of 
difference that is unique in the universe: it cannot pretend to such knowledge. 
But by the same token we cannot know that error is fundamentally similar to 
any other kind of difference. While certainly it seems true that this cleavage 
between knowledge and reality could not exist if there were no difference in the 
universe, this is a trivial prerequisite. 
Discontinuism does mirror Derrideanism however inasmuch as 
discontinuism implies a special criticism of the meta-error which consists in not 
acknowledging the significance of error as such. Of course, strictly speaking 
such a position cannot be conceived as peculiarly erroneous, but we can say it 
is the one error to which discontinuism as such is a priori opposed. Of course, 
one could certainly accuse discontinuism of a viscious circularity, since by its 
own lights even its core thesis must be erroneous. Indeed, it must allow that 
even it itself is in error, but since error is ubiquitous for discontinuists, the 
inevitable presence of error is not enough to invalidate a position. Rather, the 
discontinuist speaks regardless. 
Derrida’s epistemology is correct as far as it goes: the meanings of words are 
always ambiguous and everything refers to everything else. The discontinuist 
disagrees with Derrida about the implications of this, however. Discontinuists 
take it that what Derrida sees as the failings of “logocentrism” are really 
ineluctable problems of language use as such that cannot be superseded. 
Discontinuism ultimately implies (at least in the extreme form I am imputing to 
Foucault and Lacan) rather taking a radical step that Derrida refuses, namely 
entirely side-stepping ontology and metaphysics, rather than Derrida’s path of 
criticising them, placing them under erasure and converting Being into a still 
more abstract differance. 
The discontinuist position is effectively that when we use language we are 
trying to describe reality even though we are always going to get it wrong. 
Historically, philosophers have tended to say that we should be getting it 
entirely right, and that we will get it entirely right one day. Correspondence 
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theory is one mode of saying this, but other continuists – such, I am arguing, as 
Derrida – hope effectively to achieve the same result by less direct routes, 
specifically in Derrida’s case the acknowledgement of ambiguity. As Foucault 
states in the above-quoted exegesis of Canguilhem, however, while the errors in 
our current description can be pointed out in order to transform our 
knowledge, this will not generate a more accurate total description – since there 
is no neutral standpoint from which to judge which knowledge is more accurate 
– or an asymptotic approach to a final description. Derrida by contrast 
proposes a form of radical progress by stopping thinking of words in terms of 
univocal description, and instead approaching them via their inherent 
metaphorical play, the aim of which is not a more accurate description in a 
conventional sense, but rather a way of honouring the differences in reality. 
The discontinuist’s preference is to acknowledge knowledge’s ineliminable 
erroneousness at a meta-level. 
Derrida’s aporetic logic means gesticulating/genuflecting towards 
complexity rather than proceeding decisively in awareness of it. He opposes the 
standard continuist aim of having language reach a final, perfect hold on 
reality, but in doing so gives up attempting to hold onto it per se, in favour one 
might say of a caress of its surface. 
DELEUZE 
What then of Deleuze? The thrust of his philosophy appears diametrically 
opposed to that of Derrida’s, viz. the deliberate formulation of a metaphysics, 
whereas Derrida, following Heidegger, makes destroying metaphysics his 
project. My thesis however is that – rather like in the horseshoe theory of 
political ideology – the apparently opposite Derridean and Deleuzean extremes 
in epistemology meet in continuism. Derrida (2001, 192–193) himself indeed 
claimed on the occasion of Deleuze’s death that their two oeuvres shared a 
‘nearly total affinity’, and that ‘Deleuze undoubtably still remains, despite so 
many dissimilarities, the one among all those of my "generation" to whom I 
have always considered myself closest’. 
Deleuze straddles the divide between Foucault’s two categories of 
philosophies of concept and of the subject, perhaps to a greater extent than any 
other French thinker of twentieth century philosophy: simultaneously a 
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philosopher of experience and of conceptual creation, he recovers the deeply 
unfashionable project of metaphysics, harking back to pre-Kantian philosophy. 
As Badiou (2009, 114) says, ‘It is not easy to insert Deleuze into the usual 
genealogies.” One might expect me then to place Deleuze in an intermediate 
position between continuism and discontinuism. However, while a philosophy 
of experience lends itself to continuism by putting faith in experience as an 
inerrant contact with reality, there is nothing about a philosophy of the concept 
that implies seeing the relationship with reality as discontinuous, even if it is 
prima facie more amenable to such a viewpoint than a philosophy of 
experience is. If there is a single obvious point of agreement between Deleuze 
and Derrida, it is the thematisation of difference: it is the key concept of 
Derrida’s early work (albeit in the altered form of “differance”), and first word 
invoked in the title of Deleuze’s first major statement of his own philosophy; 
both thinkers make difference itself into something like their ultimate 
ontological principle. To invoke Peter Hallward’s (2006, 13) not entirely 
flattering – but I think accurate – characterization, Deleuze produces a 
“philosophy of creation” which valorises novelty, hence difference. However, as 
with Derrida’s philosophy of difference, Deleuze’s ontology of difference is 
paradoxically simplistic, ultimately revolving around a simple binary between 
good deterritorialisation and bad forces of stagnation. Deleuze describes a 
world where everything should move freely (which is to say that a normativity is 
built into his metaphysics), and where problems are due to the arresting of 
flows, the perversion of nature by malign forces (see in particular Deleuze and 
Guattari 1983 passim). I am tempted to deem this vision ‘Manichaean’, but this 
would be inaccurate, because it is precisely not for Deleuze an eternal battle, so 
much as an historical one that can be won. As with the Heideggerian view of 
the history of metaphysics, the Fall is viewed as a contingent mistake that can 
be overcome. This position is thus much more akin to the Christian one 
because it is somewhat unclear what the origin of evil is, beyond the fact that it 
has contingently appeared in the world and will in the fullness of time be 
defeated. Hallward deems Deleuze’s thought theophanic, indicating the 
existence of a God, that the creative force in Deleuze is singular, hence 
identifiable with God. Of course, this is certainly not how Deleuze himself 
understands his thought. 
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Deleuze like Foucault thinks that truth is not universal or transhistorical, 
but rather evental (Bartlett, Clemens, Roffe 2014, 182). Having declared this,  
however, he proceeds to produce a metaphysics that tells us how truth comes 
about which is itself universal and transhistorical. Now, one could argue that 
discontinuism also does precisely this, but there is an important difference 
between the very minimal claims made by discontinuism – viz. that language 
and reality as such exist and that there is a mismatch between them – and the 
developed metaphysics of Deleuze that pretends to provide an account of 
underlying reality in language, but somehow wishes to bypass truth in doing 
this. 
How is it possible to bypass truth? Deleuze's conception of truth, not unlike 
Foucault's, situates truth at the level of imaginary representations of reality. 
Deleuze thinks we can have a more immediate contact with reality than this, 
without the mediation of 'truth'. We can see this as a kind of natural outgrowth 
of Nietzsche's ontology, which reduces truth to the basic 'will to power'. 
Foucault, though he focuses on Nietzsche's notion of 'will to knowledge' 
(eschewing any mention of the will to power), ultimately does not engage in any 
ontological reduction of knowledge. Foucault thus retreats from the 
metaphysical aspect of Nietzsche's thought, while Deleuze seeks positively to 
extend it. 
Deleuze (1994, 148) criticises the concept of error as part and parcel of the 
conception of truth he wants to reject. Specifically, he condemns the 
determination of 'error' as 'the sole "negative" of thought'. Now, this contradicts 
Foucauldian discontinuism directly, since this is exactly what it also does, albeit 
that it conceives 'error' not merely as a 'negative' but also as a constitutive facet 
of knowledge. While Deleuze's formulation of his critique here seems to allow 
open the possibility that error can still be a useful concept if the exclusive focus 
on it is overcome, the thrust of his invective is to oppose the concept of error 
altogether. For Deleuze, error is the reverse of truth, and he wants to dispose of 
them both. 
For Deleuze (1994, 137) as for Foucault – both of them self-consciously 
following Nietzsche – thought figures as a kind of violence. It is not for Deleuze 
however the violence of words on things. Rather, for Deleuze thought figures as 
the violence of things on words: we are made to think by forces outside of 
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thought. Now, discontinuists do not have to deny that there is such an effect. 
Lacan for his part says more or less exactly the same thing as Deleuze about the 
way the real disturbs knowledge. Foucault does not ask such a question as to 
the origin of thought as such, but again clearly  does think knowledge in large 
part arises from extra-epistemic forces – indeed, his writings on epistemology 
certainly imply precisely that, namely that power is a major motive force of 
knowledge (though also vice versa). What both Lacan and Foucault both posit a 
specific power of language (that is of ‘the symbolic’, or ‘discourse’, or 
‘knowledge’) as such that cannot be reduced. Deleuze is indeed simply 
inattentive to the problem of language: as Jean-Jacques Lecercle (2002, 2) notes, 
Deleuze 'resists the linguistic turn' in French philosophy, treating language 'as a 
secondary phenomenon'. 
Deleuze (1994, 154) envisions a productive truth that is not about being 
adequate to its object. This seeks to eliminate the negativity in discontinuism: 
where thought has been haunted by negativity, Deleuze would make it positive. 
Deleuze in his late work with Guattari thus naturalises the violent irruption of 
language through a reduction of truth to describabale material elements, to 
events and bodies, in an opposite direction to what Derrida does, which might 
by contrast be characterised as a denaturalisation of the material through its 
assimilation to writing. For Deleuze, we create concepts, which attach in 
various ways to bodies (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 21). As Jon Roffe puts it, 
“Deleuze’s move here is to resituate truth as an ontological category rather 
than an epistemological one” (Bartlett, Clemens, Roffe 2014, 187). Truth for 
Deleuze is relative and historically discontinuous, constructed, but as such truth 
is simply part of a reality which we in principle can exist in and understand 
relatively unproblematically: the problem with this reduction of truth to 
materiality is that it begs the question of what the basis can be for these claims 
about the being of truth. He criticises traditional conceptions of knowledge, but 
the question of the mechanism of knowledge is in effect a yawning gap in 
Deleuze’s thought: he expounds a metaphysics without giving it a formal 
epistemological basis. Deleuze (1994, 132) thinks in terms of 'liberation' from a 
'distorting image of truth'. That is, there is an error we have fallen into that we 
have to escape from. Far from residing in thinking truth too simply, this is 
actually for Deleuze a matter of thinking truth in too complicated a way. That 
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is, Deleuze identifies truth in the final sense, as both Sartre and Lacan do, with 
the real itself, but also believes in a kind of unmediated contact with that truth 
that knowledge can be based around. Deleuze thinks however that by 
maintaining an openness to the immanent forces that bring about thought we 
can overcome the dehiscence of thought and nature, by welcoming a thought 
that is much more like nature in its chaoticness than conventional philosophy. 
For Deleuze, in his immanentism, we encounter bodies directly and thus know 
them, and questions of truth are merely a relation between our body and 
others. That is to say that epistemological continuism is implicit and 
unchallenged in Deleuze’s thought, even if his metaphysics deliberately 
accommodates a discontinuous history of knowledge. We see here a series of 
lurking influences, I think, overdetermining Deleuze’s epistemological hubris: 
Bergson’s intuitionism about truth; Nietzsche’s inheritance from 
Schopenhauerian monism that allows us direct contact with a reality that, like 
us, partakes of the element of will of an unbridled confidence that the world is 
as we experience it; Merleau-Ponty’s body-philosophy; and perhaps most 
deeply Spinoza’s monism, which Hallward (12) credits with giving Deleuze the 
idea of the “total intelligibility of things.”7  
ONTOLOGY 
One could argue that Deleuze cashes out a metaphysics of forces and bodies 
that Foucault himself effectively works with, and that Foucault simply hides 
from the necessity of making these ontological commitments explicit. Deleuze 
(1988) certainly saw Foucault’s project as something that could be ontologised 
within his framework. I think Foucault’s stance is different, however. Pace many 
readings of Foucault – for example that of Johanna Oksala (2010, 449) who 
pointedly asserts that it is impossible to avoid ontology to some extent – he 
posits such things only qua the outside of discourse which disturbs discourse. 
Foucault’s references to bodies and forces and even to power are precisely a 
reference to the outside of discourse; pace Butler (2002), it is not meant to 
 
7 While I think Hallward is right here, his quotations from Deleuze are quite misleading – this phrase is 
cited as if from Deleuze’s own mouth, but it’s actually from Martial Gueroult’s Spinoza, from an article 
about Gueroult’s interpretation of Spinoza. One comes here across the general problem of trying to 
discern what Deleuze thinks because so much of what he says is ventriloquised through other thinkers. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 346 
problematise the concepts he invokes. They are not meant either to put these 
concepts under erasure nor build a metaphysics out of them. 
It is true that ontology is unavoidable iff we understand “ontology” to refer 
to any kind of use of language to refer to mind-independent reality. However, I 
take it that this is not what “ontology” means in any accepted usage, but rather 
that this is just how language itself is generally understood to operate, and that 
“ontology” occurs only when one sets out systematically describe either being 
itself (in Heidegger’s idiosyncratic but influential definition) or, more 
commonly, what kinds of beings and relations exist, as Deleuze does. Foucault 
and Lacan do not go in for any such systematic description of being or beings: 
Lacan instead gives us at most a theoretical metapsychology, whereas Foucault 
does something even more ontologically parsimonious, trying to use language 
to refer to “visible” “things” – statements, forces, bodies – linking them up to 
“invisible” hypothetical forms like epistemes or strategies of power.8 This 
division might be said to invoke some form of ontology, but if it does, it is 
absolutely minimal. The distinction between words and things at work here is 
essentially epistemological – for discontinuism, the only ontology that is 
endorsed is the one that forbids further systematic ontology by asserting that 
words are split off from things – and while in a sense Foucault relies minimally 
on what might be described as the folk ontology embedded in our linguistic 
concepts, he does this only with the utmost caution, stipulating that his 
formulations are provisional rather than theoretical. This is ontology if, like 
Oksala (2010, 457), one takes it that “ontology consists of mere analytical grids.” 
At this point any disagreement between us may be merely semantic, but in this 
case we may say that if Foucault’s “analytical grids” constitute an ontology, it is 
a profoundly anti-realist one. The Deleuze-Foucault difference here can be 
schematised by designating Deleuze a realist about analytical grids, and 
Foucault an anti-realist about them, even though their analytical grids are not 
dissimilar. 
One might perhaps argue that since some minimal engagement with 
ontology is necessary, we ought to engage in it deliberately and maximally, as 
Deleuze does. I do not agree this conclusion follows, however. One could argue 
 
8 This distinction is made by Foucault (xi) in the preface to his Birth of the Clinic.  
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that to allow our ontological bases to remain unexamined means relying on a 
kind of spontaneous ideology that might be problematic, but Foucault obviates 
this by engaging in the critique of received opinion, without engaging in a 
systematic attempt to replace it, even though he is apt to invoke new concepts 
piecemeal to describe things where he finds the received vocabulary 
inadequate. Foucault and Lacan do not go the Derridean route of a sceptical 
deconstruction of all language, and rather are happy to posit all sorts of things, 
but fight shy of producing a metaphysics, even if Lacan, unlike Foucault, does 
deliberately propound a theoretical framework, albeit, like Freud’s, one that is 
under constant revision. The one place in his corpus where Foucault (1997) 
does positively invoke “ontology” as such, viz. in his late essays on Kant’s 
“What is Enlightenment?”, the invocation is always of a “critical” or 
“historical” ontology “of ourselves” – like Lacan, or indeed even Kant in his 
way, the only domain he is ultimately willing to do the ontology of is the 
human subject, not external reality.  
That said, Foucault does not prescribe abstaining from ontology – he rather 
only abstains from it on his own account. Discontinuism does not as a position 
imply that no one should engage in positive ontology, only that we should 
understand ontological reflection as an historically contingent form of fictive (to 
invoke indeed Foucault’s description of his own works as “fictions”) speculation, 
rather than a matter of finally uncovering the way things really are, which is to 
say, we should not understand ontology as really doing what it typically 
understands itself to be doing qua ontology, viz. describing accurately what 
there is. 
We can schematically say that all three of our ‘poststructuralists’ reject all 
earlier conceptions of truth. For Derrida, we have understood it as the 
correspondence of the signifier with the object (a definition incidentally which 
all three thinkers pointedly reject). From Foucault's Nietzschean-
Canguilhemian point of view, we have understood truth to mean non-error, 
when we really need to grasp its erroneousness. For Deleuze, we have wrongly 
understood thought as adequation to its object, and the very idea of error is 
bound up with this. The discontinuist case against Deleuze and Derrida is not 
that adequation of words to things is achievable but that we can't simply side-
step the problem in relation to adequation, inasmuch as the referential function 
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of language is ineluctable. 
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